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Abstract: We argue that the part of the future which is up to us is in principle 
unknowable. 
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It is reasonable to assume that we may not know what we are going to do on a 
particular Tuesday, even if it is all up to us. But it doesn’t appear reasonable to 
assume that it is impossible for us to know what we are going to do on a 
particular Tuesday, if it is all up to us. But there is a straight forward argument 
which shows that we cannot know what we are going to do on a particular 
Tuesday or on any other day. For if we know what we are going to do on a 
particular day, say, go to the lecture, then it is true that we are going to go to the 
lecture on that day, and thus it cannot be (not could not have been) true that we 
are not going to attend the lecture on that day. But if we can change our mind 
and not attend the lecture on that day then we can make the true proposition 
that we will attend the lecture on that day false. But that is impossible. 
For what is true cannot be (not could not have been) false.1 Nor can a 
proposition change its truth value.2 
If the above argument is sound, then an omnipotent being who can change 
his mind cannot possibly know the future. Omniscience would then be limited to 
the past and the present.  
But this does not stop us or an omniscient being from forming plans for 
the future and on the appropriate occasion to act on them. The future may then 
be open, as Aristotle contended,3 and remain open till it becomes the present.4 
 
 
                                                        
1 It is “a truth of the logic of modalities” that “if a proposition is true it is self-necessary.” (Von 
Wright 1957, 122). He explains: “… relative to the hypothesis (supposition) that it is true, a 
proposition cannot be but true (is necessarily true). Thus not: if a proposition is true, then it is 
(absolutely) necessary. But: if a proposition is true, it is self- necessary.” (Von Wright 1957, 
122) For additional discussion, see Blum (2011). 
2 For it would mean that one and the same state of affairs will both occur and not occur. For 
further discussion, see Blum (2013). 
3 See Aristotle, De Interpretatione ch 9,19a 30-40, in McKeon (1941, 48). 
4 I am deeply grateful to Menachem Domb, Yehuda Gellman, Peter Genco, Asa Kasher and 
Danny Statman for their helpful comments. 
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